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THE RESTRICTED FREEDOM TO STRIKE: 
‘FAR-REACHING’ ILO JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
 
 




In the International Labour Organisation (ILO), controversy has arisen regarding the legal 
basis of the right to strike and, accordingly, its content and scope. The trigger was the 2012 
walkout of the employers’ group from the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of 
Standards (CAS) in resistance to the jurisprudence developed by the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) on the right to strike 
under ILO Convention No. 87.1 By 2014, the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) 
was claiming that the CEACR had ‘formulated a comprehensive corpus of minutely-detailed 
strike law which amounts to a far-reaching, almost unrestricted, freedom to strike’.2 This is 
perhaps an odd statement, for a carefully detailed set of prescriptions seems unlikely to 
lead to unfettered freedoms. However, as a basis for IOE objections to the CEACR 
jurisprudence, this assertion still arguably deserves our attention. Not least because in the 
2016 Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS), the employers’ group 
were still insisting that ILO Convention No. 87 did not include the right to strike and its 
modalities; and that any right to strike was not to be regarded as ‘absolute’ but to be 
regulated at the ‘national level’.3   
                                                          
 This article is based on an invited paper delivered at a conference on the Justification of the Right to Strike in 
the ILO System of Standards held in Berlin in April 2016; and responds to the comments of the discussant, 
Professor Halton Cheadle, one of South African’s most eminent labour lawyers and a member of the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendation (CEACR), as well as the views of 
other participants at this event. Thanks go to them and to the organisers of my session, Torsten Walter and 
Helga Nielebock. All errors and omissions are my own.  
1 ILC, 101st session, 2012, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 19/1, discussed in Claire La Hovary, Showdown at the ILO? 
A Historical Perspective on the Employers’ Group’s 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike 42(4) INDUSTRIAL LAW 
JOURNAL 338 (2013); and Janice Bellace, The ILO and the Right to Strike 153(1) INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
REVIEW (2014) 29. 
2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS, DO ILO CONVENTIONS 87 AND 98 RECOGNISE A RIGHT TO 
STRIKE? (2014) at 2.  
3 See ILO International Labour Conference (ILC), Individual Case (CAS), discussion 2016, 105th ILC session 




This article examines the importance of IOE claims in relation to standards advocated by the 
CEACR regarding public sector strikes and provision of essential services. In so doing, the 
political rationale for promoting and restricting strikes is considered. It is argued that, rather 
than being ‘almost unrestricted’, ILO standards (which may also fairly be termed ‘principles’) 
are clear and proportionate. Indeed, their common sense approach, which is the result of 
tripartite deliberation in the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), as well as 
consideration by legal experts in the CEACR,4 is reflected in their use as a reference point in 
other human rights litigation. In this sense, ILO jurisprudence on the right to strike is ‘far-
reaching’, striking a chord with employer objections in 2012 and 2014. The findings of the 
CEACR and the CFA are being ‘received’ and ‘promoted’ as ‘soft law labour jurisprudence’, 
even though they are not necessarily determinative of outcomes in particular cases.5    
 
In Europe, specifically in the context of a sovereign debt crisis and austerity policies aimed at 
the retrenchment of public spending and the reduction of the public service, including the 
contracting out of what were once State provided essential services,6 the CEACR 
jurisprudence also has considerable significance. CEACR analysis of what is appropriate State 
action, in compliance with obligations under ILO instruments, offers an important basis for 
critique of what is problematic about contemporary budgetary measures and treatment of 
                                                          
Kingdom (Ratification: 1949) per ‘the Employer members’ and the ‘Employer member of the United Kingdom’ 
citing the ‘consensus position of the Government group, as expressed in February 2015’. 
4 For analysis of this ‘dual input into thinking’ and the emergence of ‘a broad and realistic consensus’, see 
BERNARD GERNIGON, ALBERTO ODERO AND HORACION GUIDO, ILO PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO 
STRIKE (1998) at 59; also discussion of this symbiotic relationship in Tonia Novitz, The Internationally 
Recognized Right to Strike: A past, present and future basis upon which to evaluate remedies for unlawful 
collective action 30(3) THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 357 (2014). 
5 See ILC, 101st session, 2012, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 19/1, at paras 49, 82 and 154 as discussed by La 
Hovary supra note 1 at 342. 
6 See Robert Boyer, The Four Fallacies of Contemporary Austerity Policies: The lost Keynesian legacy 36 
CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 283 (2012); CARMEN M REINHART AND KENNETH S ROGOFF, FROM 
FINANCIAL CRASH TO DEBT CRISIS (2010), Working Paper 15795 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15795> 
accessed 6 May 2016; STEFAN CLAUWAERT AND ISABELLE SCHÖMANN, THE CRISIS AND NATIONAL LABOUR 
LAW REFORMS:  A MAPPING EXERCISE (2012), ETUI Working Paper 2012.04; and ARISTEA KOUKIADAKI, ISABEL 
TAVORA, ISABEL AND MIGUEL MARTINEZ LUCIO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF JOINT REGULATION AND LABOUR 
MARKET POLICY IN EUROPE DURING THE CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PROJECT REPORT (2014). 
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workers in Europe today. ILO standards regarding the right to strike have perhaps never 
been more relevant, which may also be why they have come under threat.7   
 
This article proceeds by first outlining the established content of a coherent body of findings 
established by ILO supervisory bodies regarding strikes in the civil service, public sector and 
essential services, as well as the outright ban on ‘purely political strikes’. It is argued that 
this corpus follows logically from the principle advocated for some time within the ILO that 
the right to strike exists to defend the economic and social interests of workers.8 I shall then 
examine how that ‘far-reaching’ jurisprudence has received attention from European and 
other human rights institutions seeking to interpret and apply the principle of ‘freedom of 
association’. Further, I shall seek to explain the particular significance of ILO standards 
concerning the right to strike following the financial crisis and, in particular, the sovereign 
debt crisis still dominating the politics of many European States as well as countries in other 
continents.  
 
The politics of austerity, have led to shrinkage of the state provision of services and public 
sector employment. In this setting the restriction of industrial action in the public sector, by 
civil servants and other workers, has particular resonance. Arguably, the ‘austerity’ policies 
experienced in Europe can be understood as a re- manifestation of policies imposed on 
developing countries for some considerable period of time by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By the time the ‘Washington consensus’ appeared 
discredited globally,9 that prescription for addressing sovereign debt found its ways into the 
Memoranda of Understanding imposed by the Troika (the IMF, The European Commission 
                                                          
7 For analysis regarding the utility of ILO strike jurisprudence on the world stage and how this prompted a 
response from the employer lobby, see Janice Bellace, Pushback on the Right to Strike:  Resisting the 
Thickening of Soft Law in ADELLE BLACKETT AND ANNE TREBILCOCK (EDS), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW (2015). 
8 ILO, DIGEST OF DECISIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 5th ed. (2006) (ILO CFA 
DIGEST), para. 522-3; see also the CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1984) at 62; CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1994), at 66. 
This remains the position in the REPORT OF THE CEACR ON APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
STANDARDS (2014) for e.g. at 73: ‘the right to strike is one of the essential means available to trade unions to 
further and defend the interests of their members’. 
9 Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, The Death of the Washington Consensus? 16(3) WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 79 
(1999); James M. Cypher, The Slow Death of the Washington Consensus on Latin America 25(6) LATIN 
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 47 (1998); Robert K. McCleery and Fernando De Paolis, The Washington Consensus: 
A post-mortem 19 JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS 438 (2008). 
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and the European Central Bank) and into more general prescriptions for economic growth in 
the European Union (EU) Growth 2020 Strategy.10 The result is that recent European cases 
speak to a global commonality of concern with responsible democratic government and 
public provision of services that unites the developed and developing worlds. In this way, 
they offer an important illustration of the relevance of ILO principles on the right to strike as 
a touchstone for concern and legitimate complaint beyond national borders. 
 
Related challenges are presented by action in essential services. Some time ago, we might 
have assumed that essential services could (and would) be delivered by public sector 
workers. This palpably is no longer the case. A process of privatization began globally some 
time ago and has accelerated in European States under austerity, again in an effort to 
reduce public spending.11 In response, action is being taken by workers to constrain the 
‘contracting out’ of essential services and regulate the new forms of their supply. This is 
motivated by workers’ self-interest (the desire to preserve jobs, terms and conditions), but 
also public interest (concerns regarding the quality of service likely to be delivered 
subsequently).12 Their motivations might perhaps seem at odds with the notion that strikes 
should not be ‘purely political’. Indeed, the legitimacy of strikes which make political 
statements has been fiercely contested, perhaps because such action is seen as potentially 
disruptive of legitimate democratic processes by governments and to have effects on 
employers which are beyond their control (as the dispute does not originate with them).13 
However, it is suggested here that, on careful dissection of what we mean by the term 
‘political’, a freedom to strike, subject to sensible restrictions, can serve democratic 
objectives.   
 
                                                          
10 Susanne Lütz and Matthias Kranke, The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending 
to Central and Eastern European countries 21(2) REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 310 (2014). 
11 It is interesting that in the recent CEACR report on the Beamte, it is observed that ‘civil servants (Beamte) 
working in state enterprises perform the same tasks after privatization’. See Observation (CEACR) – Germnay - 
Adopted 2014, Published 104th ILC Session (2015).  
12 A much publicised example is the UK junior doctors’ strike, in respect of which see: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/01/junior-doctors-strike-to-go-ahead-next-wednesday-says-
bma; and http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/public-overwhelmingly-blame-jeremy-hunt-for-
junior-doctors-strike-poll-finds-a6864666.html accessed 29 September 2016. 
13 See also for this observation TONIA NOVITZ, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT 
TO STRIKE (2003), at 56. 
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2.  Core elements of ILO jurisprudence on the origins, content and scope of the right 
to strike  
 
The fundamental starting point of ILO supervisory bodies is that ‘the right to strike is one of 
the essential means through which workers and their organizations may promote and 
defend their economic and social interests’14 and ‘an intrinsic corollary to the right to 
organize protected by Convention No. 87’.15 The CFA and the CEACR link this entitlement to 
‘the right of workers’ and employers’ organizations to organize their activities and to 
formulate their programmes for the purposes of furthering and defending the interests of 
their members (Articles 3, 8 and 10 of Convention No. 87)’.16  
 
At the time of the employers’ group  ‘walk out’ from the CAS in 2012, the employers’ group 
argued that: ‘the following issues concerning the right to strike should be discussed on a 
tripartite basis, rather than left to the experts to develop on their own’. These were to 
include: ‘lawful strikes, including … political strikes; essential services, especially if on a 
narrow basis’… etc.17 This was prior to their preference for national determination of such 
detailed questions.18  
 
It remains a curious request since the ‘interpretation’ of freedom of association and its 
essential correlative, the right to strike, originated first in the jurisprudence of the CFA 
decided by tripartite consensus. While the CEACR consists of technical legal experts, the CFA 
has a tripartite constitution and its findings reflect not only legal niceties, but the consensual 
findings of employers, workers and governments on the importance of industrial action (and 
                                                          
14 ILO CFA DIGEST, para. 522; see also the CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1984) at 62; THE REPORT OF THE CEACR ON APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR STANDARDS (2014) at 73; and Case No. 3111 (Poland), 378th Report of the ILO CFA (2016) para. 674 at 
para. 708. 
15 ILO CFA DIGEST, para. 523. 
16 CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1994), at 66. Note also THE ILO GENERAL SURVEY 
ON THE FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING RIGHTS AT WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE ILO 
DECLARATION ON SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR A FAIR GLOBALIZATION 2008 (2012), 46 et seq.   
17 ILC, 101st session, 2012, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS: SUBMISSION, 
DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION at 27/2: Mr SYDER (Employer, United Kingdom; Employer Vice- Chairperson of the 
Committee on the Application of Standards). See also for discussion of this claim, Claire La Hovary, The ILO’s 
Employers’ Group and the Right to Strike 22(3) TRANSFER 401 at 402 (2016).  
18 Supra note 3. 
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the identification of standards for its exercise) to the realisation of freedom of association 
globally. The two have come to complement and reinforce each other.19  
 
The CFA jurisprudence (reflected in CEACR findings) has not only been concluded for the 
benefit of the workers’ group. If that were so, it might well be an ‘unrestricted freedom’.20 
Instead, the legitimate concerns of government regarding democratic accountability, 
effective government and the welfare of citizens are reflected in the rules regarding political 
strikes.  Further, the concerns of governments and employers (and, indeed, governments as 
employers) can be detected in the specific treatment of political strikes, essential services 
and in the civil service and public sector more generally in line with these principles.  
 
‘Strikes of a purely political nature … do not fall within the scope of the principles of 
freedom of association.’21 However, this is subject to two important qualifications. The first 
is that: ‘While purely political strikes do not fall within the scope of the principles of 
freedom of association, trade unions should be able to have recourse to protest strikes, in 
particular where aimed at criticizing a government’s economic and social policies.’22 So 
‘protest’ which does not necessarily involve absence from work for a lengthy duration is to 
be permitted. Secondly, where there is a link to the economic and social interests of 
workers, industrial action may be taken: ‘The occupational and economic interests which 
workers defend through the exercise of the right to strike do not only concern better 
working conditions or collective claims of an occupational nature, but also the seeking of 
solutions to economic and social policy questions and problems facing the undertaking 
which are of direct concern to the workers.’23 The number of jobs in the public sector, the 
types of job available, issues of privatization and contracting out of services, and the terms 
and conditions of work would all therefore be issues in which workers have a legitimate 
interest to be defended through industrial action. This would be the case in the context of 
an over-arching policy aimed at austerity, or cutting public spending.  Notably, in a recent 
                                                          
19 Supra note 4. See also See ITUC, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE ILO: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS (2014) 
available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_final_brief_on_the_right_to_strike.pdf; and Bellace supra  
note 1 at 30 and 47 – 50. 
20 Supra note 2. 
21 ILO CFA DIGEST, para. 528. 
22 Ibid., para. 529. 
23 Ibid., para. 526.  
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Polish case of 2016, the CFA observed that a ‘Social Dialogue Council’ would assist in 
defending workers’ occupational and economic interests, the Government still had ‘to take 
the necessary measures in order to ensure that workers’ organizations are able to express if 
necessary, through protest actions, more broadly, their views as regards economic and 
social matters affecting their members’ interests’.24 
 
While economic and social interests are legitimate objectives of industrial action (despite 
their political dimensions), the effects of strikes are also relevant. In this respect, again, the 
freedom to strike is not unqualified, and nor would we expect either a tripartite body (such 
as the CFA) or legal experts (such as the CEACR) to find it to be so. Industrial action can be 
restricted in essential services ‘the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal 
safety or health of the whole or part of the population’25 and in the event of ‘an acute 
national emergency and for a limited period of time’.26  However, even where there is a 
strike in essential services ‘temporary measures’ should not be ‘out of proportion to the 
ends pursued or lead to excesses’.27 Ideally, a ‘minimum service’ is to be agreed in 
advance.28 Essential services may be supplied by a public sector organisation, but (as noted 
above) this is perhaps less frequently the case, particularly in the context of austerity, where 
the size of the State is shrinking (along with the public budget).  
 
Industrial action can be further restricted for ‘public servants exercising authority in the 
name of the State’.29 This is ostensibly a restriction placed on the identity of the strikers 
rather the strike’s effects. However, arguably, it is the operation of necessary State 
functions vital to the welfare of those living within the State, such as delivery of justice 
through the courts, which is ultimately at stake here. Hence a ‘minimum service’ may be 
applied here too, where industrial action by such workers is permitted.30 
 
                                                          
24 Case No. 3111 (Poland), 378th Report of the ILO CFA (2016) para. 674 at para. 712. 
25 ILO CFA DIGEST, at para. 578. In this scenario a minimum service may be appropriate which is proportionate 
– see paras. 607 and 634.  
26 Ibid., at para. 570. See also in respect of these principles CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY ON FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION (1994), paras 152, 158 and 159.  
27 ILO CFA DIGEST, at para. 669. 
28 Ibid., para. 612. 
29 Ibid., para. 541. 
30 Ibid., para. 606. 
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The notion of exercising ‘authority in the name of the State’ is strictly construed by ILO 
supervisory bodies. It may be notable that the other key challenge to the authority of the 
CEACR by the employers’ group was in 1994, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and 
concerning the German practice of excluding all ‘civil servants’ (or Beamte) from access to 
industrial action.31 This was considered by the CEACR then (as now) to be in violation of the 
general precept that ‘prohibition of strikes should be limited to public servants exercising 
authority in the name of the State and to services, the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’. 
However, Germany remained in breach of these principles since the Beamte had (and 
continue to have) special status in that they swear an oath of allegiance to the State that 
cannot be broken through industrial action in exchange for other employment security and 
pension benefits. The indignation of the German employer representative, Alfred 
Wisskirchen, may have arisen partially for this reason but also led to the first challenge to 
the CEACR’s interpretative authority, although he subsequently elaborated upon his 
opposition in more extensive ways.32 This is an issue that I will return to later, for once upon 
a time the German treatment of civil servants was exceptional, but such an approach is 
becoming ever more frequent in the context of European austerity.33 
 
Both the CFA and CEACR have concluded that, even where restriction is appropriate for 
‘public servants’ as designated above, or where essential services are truly at issue, there 
should be sufficient residual or ‘compensatory’ guarantees for the workers to protect their 
interests. This would seem to be in accordance with the dispute settlement mechanisms 
recognised in Article 8 of ILO Convention No. 151 of 1978, but also broader principles of 
justice. The utility of the work cannot be justified as a means by which to reduce the 
workers’ welfare. There are to be ‘impartial and prompt conciliation and arbitration 
                                                          
31 ILC, 81st session, 1994, ILC, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS, PART TWO: 
OBSERVATIONS AND INFORMATION ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTION at 25/91: C87, Germany. 
32 ILC, 81st session, 1994, ILC, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS: 
SUBMISSION, DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION at 28/90, Mr. WISSKIRCHEN (Employers' adviser, Germany; 
Employer Vice-Chairman of the Committee on the Application of Standards). See also Alfred Wisskirchen, The 
Standard-setting and Monitoring Activity of the ILO: Legal questions and practical experience' 144 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 253 (2005). 
33 See Case No. 3111 (Poland), 378th Report of the ILO CFA (2016) para. 674 at para. 715 where the Committee 
invited the Government to establish a procedure (i) for determining which public servants are ‘exercising 
authority in the name of the State and for whom the right to strike can be restricted’ and (ii) ‘for defining the 
minimum service where appropriate’. 
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proceedings to ensure that all parties may participate at all stages and in which arbitration 
proceedings are binding on both parties’.34  For example, the ILO CFA has found that 
restrictions placed on the right to strike in the prisons service are problematic insofar as 
these are not accompanied by unbiased and speedy conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings, the outcomes of which are fully and properly implemented.35   
 
3. The reach of ILO jurisprudence in other human rights systems 
 
ILO jurisprudence and, more particularly, its application in the civil service and public sector 
employment, was extremely influential in the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Demir & Baykara v Turkey.  Decided in 2007, this 
case found that civil service unions were entitled to collective bargaining and enforcement of 
the resultant collective agreements under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 (ECHR).36  
 
The case concerned a trade union, Tüm Bel Sen, which was established in 1990 to represent 
civil servants. In 1993, this union concluded a collective agreement concerning pay and 
working conditions with the Gaziantep Municipal Council for a period of two years, but the 
agreement was not honoured. When the union sought to rely on the collective agreement in 
court proceedings, their claim was initially upheld by the District Court. However, the decision 
was eventually overturned by the Cour de Cassation. Moreover, during this time, the 
Constitution was amended (in 1995) and a Law introduced (in 2001),37 which meant that, 
while civil servants’ unions could engage in collective bargaining under certain conditions, 
they were not entitled to enter into valid collective agreements directly with the authorities 
concerned. Monies originally paid out to civil servants by virtue of the District Court 
proceedings therefore had to be repaid. A complaint under Article 11 of the ECHR was 
brought by one of the union members, Mr Kemal Demir, who was asked to repay the sum 
                                                          
34 CFA DIGEST, para. 532; GERNIGON ET AL, note 4 at 17-18; and CEACR, GENERAL SURVEY CONCERNING 
LABOUR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE (2013), 169 - 186.    
35 Case No. 2383 (UK), 336th Report of the ILO CFA (2005) paras 773 and 777. 
36 Application 34503/97 Demir and Baykara v Turkey, judgment of 12 November 2008. See K.D.Ewing and John 
Hendy, The Dramatic Implications of Demir  and Baykara 39 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 2 (2010). 
37 Law no. 4688 on civil servants' trade unions, 25 June 2001. 
10 
 
originally granted to him by way of compensation and by Mrs Vicdan Baykara, the President 
of Tüm Bel Sen. 
 
Here the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR considered it significant that Turkey had ratified ILO 
Convention No. 98 and placed stress on general recognition that civil servants are entitled to 
collective bargaining, as is reflected in ILO Convention No. 151, which was also ratified by 
Turkey.38 Explicit reference was also made to the finding of the ILO CEACR that the exclusion 
of ‘public servants’ from ILO Convention No. 98 (under Article 6) excluded ‘only those 
officials who are directly employed in the administration of the State’ alongside the police 
and armed forces.39 ‘With that exception, all other persons employed by the government, 
by public enterprises or by autonomous public institutions should benefit… in the same 
manner as other employees, and consequently should be able to engage in collective 
bargaining … (General Survey 1994, freedom of association and collective bargaining, on 
Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 [ILO, 1994a], § 200).’40 Moreover, the ECtHR appreciated 
that it ‘can and must take into account elements of international law other than the 
Convention’ as well as ‘the interpretation of such elements by competent organs’.41  
 
Subsequently, the ECtHR has accepted that restrictions can lawfully be placed on members 
of the armed forces, the police and the administration of the State, clearly in line with ILO 
Convention No. 98 (Article 6). However, even in these cases, restrictions are to be construed 
strictly and should be confined to the ‘exercise’ rather than the ‘existence’ of trade union 
rights under Article 11. The ‘essence’ of the right to organise has to be preserved, so that a 
total ban on the creation of associations in these professions would not comply with Article 
11 without a powerful justification.42  
                                                          
38 Demir and Baykara v Turkey supra note 36, at paras 147 - 148.   
39 For a recent reiteration of this view of the scope of trade union anti-discrimination principles, see Case No. 
2888 (Poland), 363rd Report of the CFA (2012) at para. 1084. 
40 Ibid., para. 43. 
41 Ibid. at para. 85. For discussion see Virginia Mantouvalou, Labour Rights in the European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation 13 HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW REVIEW (2013) 529; and Klaus Lörcher, The New Social Dimension in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): The Demir and Baykara Judgment, its Methodology and Follow-up in FILIP 
DORSSEMONT, KLAUS LÖRCHER AND ISABELLE SCHÖMANN (eds), THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION (2013) at 6-10 and 16 – 18.  
42 See Application 10609/10 Matelly v France, judgment of 2 October 2014; and Application 45892/09, Junta 




The Demir judgment has proved foundational for a finding that the right to strike should 
also be protected under Article 11 of the ECHR, again even in the civil service.43 For 
example, the case of Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen44 concerned another civil servants’ union planning a 
national one day strike constituting peaceful action aimed at securing a collective 
agreement. On 13 April 1996 the Prime Minister’s Public Service Staff Directorate published 
circular no. 1996/21, which, inter alia, prohibited all public sector employees from taking 
part in this action. Despite the circular, some of the trade union’s board members took part 
in the strike and were subjected to sanctions as a result. The ECtHR accepted that the right 
to strike was not absolute and could be subject to certain conditions and restrictions, but 
expressed concern that the sanctions imposed were such as to discourage trade union 
members and other persons from acting upon a legitimate wish to take part in such a day of 
strike action or other forms of action aimed at defending their affiliates' interests.45 The 
ECtHR concluded, according to the Registrar’s summary, that ‘the adoption and application 
of the circular did not answer a “pressing social need” and that there had been 
disproportionate interference with the applicant union’s rights. There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 11’.46  
 
Subsequently, in the RMT v UK case, the fact of the ILO employers’ walk out was not 
considered to be sufficient to deter the ECtHR from continued reference to ILO 
jurisprudence. However, the judgment referred to, but did not ultimately follow either the 
findings of the European Social Charter Committee of Social Rights or the ILO on secondary 
action. That decision was taken on the basis that sympathetic action was not the core but ‘a 
secondary or accessory aspect of trade union activity’ to which a wider margin of 
appreciation applied, but it is also possible that the finding was a response to the pressure 
that employer dissent placed on the Court’s previous attempt to ‘integrate’ ILO 
                                                          
43 Dorssemont thereby concludes that the ‘ECHR relates the right to strike to an issue of the right to organise…’ 
in Filip Dorssemont, The Right to Take Collective Action in the Council of Europe: A Tale of One City, Two 
Instruments and Two Bodies 27(1) KING’S LAW JOURNAL 67 (2016) at 70.  
44 Application 68959/01 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey, judgment of 21 April 2009. 
45 Ibid., para. 35. 
46 Available at: file:///C:/Users/lwtan/Chrome%20Local%20Downloads/003-2712212-2963054.pdf (accessed 
on 29 September 2016). Also discussed by Mimi Zhou, A Freestanding Right or a Means to an End? The right to 
strike in the ILO and EU legal frameworks 15 TRINITY COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 101 (2012) at 116-117. 
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jurisprudence.47 More recently, in the case of Hrvatski Lijecnicki Sindikat v Croatia,48 it was 
found that it was a violation of Article 11 (disproportionate to the interests of the public) to 
prevent a union of medical and dental practitioners seeking to conclude a collective 
agreement with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare from taking industrial action for 
over three years. The judgment describes the strike as ‘the most powerful instrument to 
protect occupational interests of its members’49 and extensive reference is made to ILO 
standards in the ‘Concurring Opinion’ of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.  
 
So ILO standards are not applied uncritically in ECtHR cases regarding the right to strike, but 
they are the starting point for much analysis. The considerable attention shown to the views 
of the ILO supervisory bodies is significant, given the pressures on the ECtHR which have 
arisen in times of financial crisis to defer to the austerity-based policy prescriptions of the 
EU.50 
 
Further, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) responsible for supervision of the 
European Social Charter 1961 has embraced the relevance of ILO norms. In the LO and TCO 
v Sweden case,51 in which the scope of the right to strike was at issue, the International 
Organisation of Employers (IOE) and BusinessEurope offered their ‘Observations’, which 
explicitly included reference to the 2012 walk out of the ILO employers’ group (of which the 
IOE is the Secretariat). Those ‘Observations’ concluded that:  
Given the importance of this debate at international level, with possible relevant 
repercussions at national level, the IOE trusts that the Committee of Social Rights 
                                                          
47 Application 31045/10 The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) v the UK, judgment 
of 8 April 2014 [2014] IRLR 467 paras 87-99. See Vilija Velyvyte, The Right to Strike in the European Union after 
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: Identifying Conflict and Achieving Coherence 15 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 73 (2015) at 81 and Alan Bogg and K.D. Ewing, The Implications of the RMT Case  
43(3) INDUS. L. J. 221 (2014). 
48 Application 36701/09, Hrvatski Lijecnicki Sindikat v Croatia, judgment of 27 November 2014. 
49 Ibid., para. 59. 
50 See on pensions, Application 13341/14, da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal, judgment of 24 September 2015. 
This finding is consistent with the finding of the ECtHR in Appln No. 57665/12 and 57567/12 Koufaki and Adedy 
v Greece, judgment of 7 May 2013. 
51 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v 




will take into account the current discussion taking place among the ILO tripartite 
constituents when deciding on the merits of the present complaint.52 
This did not stop the ECSR finding that Swedish amendments to relevant legislation were in 
breach of Article 6(4) by virtue of ‘the right of workers and trade unions to engage in 
collective action for the protection of economic and social interests of the workers’,53 or 
reference being made in the decision to ‘the relevant provisions of the ILO conventions Nos 
87, 98 and 154’54 and more generally to ‘internationally binding standards’.55 The decision of 
the ECSR finding, inter alia, a breach of Article 6(4) has since been endorsed by the 
Committee of Ministers.56  
 
Subsequently, in line with ECtHR findings regarding public sector bargaining, the ECSR 
(supported by a bare majority in the Committee of Ministers) found that the total restriction 
of the right to strike of the Irish police force constituted ‘a complete abolition of the right to 
strike’ in breach of Article 6(4) of the Social Charter. As such, the restriction required further 
justification. The mere title of ‘police’ (‘Garda Síochána’) was not itself sufficient to warrant 
complete exclusion of this occupational group from access to collective action, although 
measures could be taken if prescribed by law, serving a legitimate purpose and necessary in 
a democratic society for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others or for the 
protection of public interest, national security, public health or morals.57 It seems that the 
ECSR is promoting ‘minimum service’ as the most proportionate way to restrict the right to 
strike in public sector scenarios.58 Once again, ILO standards provide an invaluable basis for 
                                                          
52 LO v TCO v Sweden, Observations by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and BusinessEurope, 
registered at the Secretariat on 7 May 2013, para. 167.  
53 Ibid., para. 120. 
54 LO and TCO v Sweden, para. 110. 
55 Ibid., para. 121. 
56 Resolution CM/ResChS(2014)1, 5 February 2014. 
57 Resolution CM/ResChS(2014) 12, 8 October 2014. Notably, in the case before the European Committee of 
Social Rights, European Confederation of Police (EuroCOP) v Ireland, Complaint No. 83/2012,  Decision on 
admissibility and on the merits, 3 July 2013, cited LO v TCO v Sweden (at para. 210); and it was the Irish 
Government that sought to rely on the CEACR General Survey on treatment of the police (at para 196) to no 
avail. See also for an outline of treatement of ‘public officials’ and ‘essential services’, see Stefan Clauwaert, 
The Right to Collective Action (Including Strike) from the Perspective of the European Social Charter of the 
Council of Europe 22(3) TRANSFER 405 (2016) at 407 - 408. 
58 Dorssement supra note 43 at 86. Cf. advocacy of ‘minimum service’ as a solution  in Rochelle le Roux and 
Tamara Cohen, Understanding the Limitations to the Right to Strike in Essential and Public Services in the SADC 
Region 19 PER/PELJ (2016) at 19. 
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analysis of compliance with European socio-economic human rights standards, even if not 
treated as determinative.   
 
It should also be observed that interest in ILO standards is not a purely European 
phenomenon, for we have also seen the Canadian Supreme Court (SC) referring to the 
significance of ILO standards and the findings of ILO supervisory bodies in public sector 
cases. The case which linked the entitlement to freedom of association to collective 
bargaining (in a way comparable to Demir & Baykara) was the British Columbia Health 
Services case.59 In 2015, in the Saskatchewan case, the Canadian SC was able to confirm 
that: ‘The right to strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining, it is an 
indispensable component of that right.’ 60 In this way it is arguable that the Canadian 
Supreme Court goes further than the European Court of Human Rights. While a minority 
judgment delivered by Rothstein and Wagner JJ cited ‘trouble at the ILO’61 this was not 
enough to divert the majority from compliance with mainstream ILO jurisprudence of both 
the CEACR and the CFA.62 On this basis the SC found that the Public Service Essential 
Services Act (PEESA) which placed a total strike ban on those unilaterally designated 
‘essential service employees’ without any alternative mechanism for overcoming bargaining 
impasses constituted a violation of the principle of freedom of association under s.2(d) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
4. Recent developments in European cases at the ILO 
 
What we see in Europe is that there is a move towards reduction of public spending as well 
as decrease (and contracting out) of public services. This can be attributed to prompts from 
Memoranda of Understanding determining the terms of ‘bailouts’ and other ‘financial 
assistance’ (as emergency measures),63 but also the more general guidance given in the 
                                                          
59 Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia [2007] 2 SCR 391. 
60 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 2015 SCC 4, para. 3. 
61 Ibid. paras 152-153.  
62 Ibid., paras 67-68. For comment, see Judy Fudge, Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: 
Freedom of Association, Collective Bargaining and Strikes 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 267 (2015) 
63 ILO Report on the High Level Mission to Greece (Geneva: ILO, 2011), para. 14 and 23. See also Aristea 
Koukiadaki and Lefteris Kretsos, Opening Pandora’s Box: The sovereign debt crisis and labour market 
regulation in Greece 41(3) INDUSTRIAL LAW JOURNAL 276 (2012) and Catharine Barnard, EU Employment Law 
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Country Specific Recommendations issued to individual EU Member States as part of the 
2020 Growth Strategy.64 Such measures can also be autonomously adopted due to whole-
hearted ideological commitment to the orthodoxy of austerity, as the UK and provincial 
Canadian governments ably demonstrate. With this trend comes restriction of industrial 
action by those working in the public sector or services of public interest and so too the 
scope to strike in protest at the measures being taken. 
 
My suggestion is that we can trace these developments by looking at the EU country reports 
coming before the CEACR and the cases coming to the CFA. There are instances where there 
has been a positive response to the findings of ILO supervisory bodies. For example, in 
Estonia a general prohibition of industrial action in the public sector is to be replaced by a 
list of services where the right to strike will be restricted65 and in Poland there is hope of 
reform to exclude those in more junior civil service provisions from the ban on industrial 
action,66 although neither piece of legislation has yet been sighted by the CEACR. Also, in 
Lithuania the Labour Code was amended in 2014 in respect of essential services and 
arbitration on minimum service.67  However, overall the issues highlighted before ILO 
supervisory bodies demonstrate the following overarching trends in the national ‘austerity’ 
driven policies of European governments: 
i. Greater restrictions on access of ‘civil servants’ and ‘public sector’ workers to 
industrial action; 
ii. Broadening of the scope of essential services or ‘services of public interest’ in 
which workers are prevented from taking industrial action; 
                                                          
and the European Social Model: The Past, the Present and the Future 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 199 
(2014) at 230. 
64 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/2015/index_en.htm 
accessed 2 March 2016 and also see re more explicit requirements to contain wages and reduce public 
spending - ANNEX to the Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on broad guidelines for the 
economic policies of the Member States and of the Union COM(2015) 99 final 2.3.2015 at 2. 
65 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Estonia). 
66 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC Session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Poland). The CEACR has recommended that review of which public servants be included in restriction of the 
right to strike be considered by ‘a tripartite body.  
67 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Lithuania); and Case No. 2907 (Lithuania), 376th Report (2015), esp. at para. 71.  
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iii. Increasingly harsh measures taken against trade unions and strikers for their 
protest related activities.  
 
In respect of all three developments, the ILO supervisory bodies reiterate the established 
principles noted above, namely that merely having the status of a ‘civil servant’ is not 
sufficient to justify a State’s decision to exclude that person from access to collective 
bargaining or the right to strike. Rather, ‘the prohibition of strikes could only be acceptable 
in the case of public servants exercising authority in the name of the State or of workers in 
essential services in the strict sense of the term, i.e. services whose interruption could 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’.68 This 
rule is, of course, still subject to the scope given to temporary emergency exceptions,69 
which, as we shall see, seems to have shaped some of the CFA and CEACR responses to 
measures taken regarding public sector employment in Europe, especially in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. However, what these scenarios demonstrate is the enduring relevance 
of transnational ILO standards on the content and scope of a freedom to strike.  
 
i. Greater legislative restrictions on strikes in the civil and public service 
 
In several European States, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, governments have 
interfered in the wage-setting and collective bargaining processes, so that legislation is 
introduced requiring stark cuts to wages.70 It is perhaps not surprising that, since States wish 
to reduce the efficacy of trade union collective bargaining in the public sector, access to the 
right to strike is likewise restricted.  
 
Germany is by no means the only European State where restrictions on strikes extend to 
civil servants who are not exercising authority in the name of the State, but are performing 
more usual functions. In particular, it is the status of teachers that most concerns the 
                                                          
68 CFA DIGEST, para. 541. To this must also be added temporary emergency measures, for which see further 
infra.  
69 Ibid., paras 570-571. 
70 ILO REPORT ON THE HIGH LEVEL MISSION TO GREECE (2011), para. 152; Observation (CEACR) – adopted 
2015, published 105th ILC Session (2016) ILO Convention 1949 No. 98 (Portugal); Case No. 3072 (Portugal), 
376th Report (2015) at para. 900 – 903; Case No. 2947 (Spain), 371st Report (2014) at paras 456 - 461. 
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Committee.71 This is an issue which overlaps with the approach of the Committee regarding 
what are to be regarded as ‘essential services’ suitable for restriction of industrial action. 
For example, despite ILO CEACR criticism and that of its own National Coordination 
Mechanism on Human Rights, Bulgaria continues its blanket prohibition of strikes in the civil 
service.72  
 
Similarly, in Croatia, new legislation was introduced in 2010 (seemingly prompted by EU 
level concerns over the rigidity of trade union engagement in wage-setting in the ‘public 
service’). By 2015 the CEACR was lamenting the lack of a Croatian report on this issue and 
recommending social dialogue as a strategy for its resolution.73 This is reminiscent of the 
CFA’s recommendations regarding Greece.74  
 
Indeed, due to sensitivity to the enormity of the economic crisis being experienced by 
certain countries, social dialogue has been a common recommendation of ILO supervisory 
organs,75 but one which is increasingly problematic as genuine trade union representation 
(which had largely been concentrated in the public sector) declines across Europe.  
 
ii. Broadening of the scope of essential services or ‘services of public interest’  
 
Here, the newly enacted UK Trade Union Act 2016 offers a prime example of new 
restrictions on industrial action. This legislation imposes strike ballot thresholds (40% of 
those eligible to vote being in favour together with the general requirement of at least a 
50% turnout) which will be applied in respect of strikes which are described as ‘important 
                                                          
71 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Germany); Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 
87 (Denmark); see also CFA Case No. 3039 (Denmark), 373rd Report (2014) at para. 261. 
72 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Bulgaria). 
73 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1949 No. 98 
(Croatia). 
74 Case 2820 (Greece), 365th Report (2012) at para. 1003 where the CFA recommended that:  
‘the Government promote and strengthen the institutional framework for collective bargaining and social 
dialogue and urges, as a general matter, that permanent and intensive social dialogue be held on all issues 
raised in the complaint and in its conclusions with the aim of developing a comprehensive common vision for 
labour relations in the country in full conformity with the principles of freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of collective bargaining and the relevant ratified ILO Conventions.’ 
75 See Case No. 3072 (Portugal),376th Report (2015) at para. 927. 
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public services’.76 This seems to be a response to a growing tendency in the UK for there to 
be public sector strikes, this being the most unionised sector, but also where the greatest 
changes have recently been seen in terms of restructuring around budget cuts.77 
Regulations will specify to which ‘important public services’ this rule applies. At the time of 
writing the draft Regulations published indicate that the following categories of services will 
be covered by this additional requirement: (a) health services; (b) education of those aged 
under 17; (c) fire services; (d) transport services; and (e) border security.78 In the course of 
the drafting process, it has been decided that ‘ancillary’ workers will not be covered by 
these special measures.79   
 
The UK initiative goes against the longstanding findings of the CFA and CEACR that teachers 
and transport workers, ‘irrespective of their status do not amount to exercising authority in 
the name of the State’80 and are not truly essential services.81 This is also because ‘a 
requirement of the support of 40 per cent of all the workers to carry out a strike would 
constitute an obstacle to the right of workers’ organizations to carry out their activities 
without interference’.82 Rather, it is recommended that the UK have recourse to ‘negotiated 
minimum services’ as appropriate.83 These are findings that arguably come as no surprise 
being consistent with the longstanding jurisprudence of the CFA and CEACR.84 If the UK 
Conservative Government modifies its plans in line with these recommendations that might, 
however, limit its ability to make a planned £12 billion of spending cuts predominantly in 
                                                          
76 See Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, Legislating for Control: the Trade Union Act 2016 45(3) INDUSTRIAL LAW 
JOURNAL 277 (2016). 
77 Kurt Vandaele, Interpreting Strike Activity in Western Europe in the Past 20 Years: The labour repertoire 
under pressure 22(3) TRANSFER 277 (2016) at 285 and 291. 
78 Trade Union Bill, clause 3 inserting after s.226A inter alia s.226(2E). See also the Government response to 
the consultation on ballot thresholds in important public services, January 2016, Annex B, ‘Skeleton 
regulations’.  
79 See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-public-bill-office/2015-16/compared-bills/Trade-
Union-Bill-As-Amended-in-Cttee-Tracked-changes.pdf, last checked 2 March 2016.  
80 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Germany). 
81 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 (UK). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness … Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the 
Trade Union Bill 2015’ 44(4) ILJ 522 (2015) at 528-533. 
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the public services sector because the trade unions might effectively protest against it doing 
so.85  
 
Civil mobilization orders initiated by the Greek Government to curtail industrial action in 
public transport and secondary education (again with large budgetary objectives in mind) 
were also criticized by the CEACR because the industrial action could not be such as to 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.86  
 
Further, the scope of minimum service requirements in legitimate essential services has 
been systematically heightened in various States, such as Hungary and Spain, again 
generating criticism from the CEACR.87 For example, in Hungary the minimum level of 
service in the local and suburban passenger transport services is 66% and national and 
regional passenger transport services is 50% which the CEACR. In this respect the CEACR has 
recalled that ‘the minimum service must genuinely and exclusively be a minimum service, 
that is one limited to the operations which are strictly necessary to meet the basic needs of 
the population…’ – as it stands ‘it is practically impossible to organize or maintain a lawful 
strike’.88 In Spain, the Committee is recommending that the State ‘address through tripartite 
dialogue the operation of the procedures for the determination of minimum services’.89 
 
iii. Harsh measures taken against trade unions and strikers for their protest related 
activities.  
 
Finally, what emerges from the issues reaching the CEACR and CFA is that, while trade 
unions are organising protest against austerity measures, European States are reacting in 
increasingly repressive ways.  
                                                          
85 Ford and Novitz supra note 76 at 293. 
86 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Greece).  
87 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Hungary); Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 
87 (Spain) and Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC Session (2013) ILO Convention 
1948 No. 87 (Spain).  
88 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Hungary). 




For example, the Belgian Government had engaged in a strategy of ‘arrests, certain of which 
were taken as a preventative measure… at the Euro-demonstration organized in Brussels by 
European trade unions’. When the CEACR came to comment on this conduct in 2013, the 
Committee noted that the investigations of this incident had not been made public.90 In 
Greece, penal measures against non-violent protests by seafarers were highlighted,91 while 
in Malta, there are ongoing allegations of anti-union dismissals by public officers, and 
reports of portworkers and public transport workers who are excluded through legislation 
from the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals and only have recourse to a Public Service 
Commission.92 In Poland, there are allegations of prohibition of display of trade union flags 
and violent police intervention in demonstrations and pickets.93 In Spain, it is alleged by the 
ITUC and Spanish Trade Union Confederation that a new Act of 2015 will restrict freedom of 
assembly, expression and demonstration ‘essential to freedom of association’.94 
 
Moreover, workers’ voices are now being cancelled out of consultative processes. For 
example, in Denmark, a new piece of legislation was announced by the Prime Minister on 25 
April 2013, adopted by Parliament the following day and entered into force on 27 April 2013 
which amended and extended collective agreements for certain groups of workers in the 
public sector without responding to trade union concerns. The Government was assisted 
only by employers in the preparation of the Bill.95 This is a pattern becoming familiar in 
various other EU Member States. In Greece, certain key measures were adopted not only 
without social dialogue but without Parliamentary debate by the Ministerial Council, see 
Act6/2012; a comparable failure of social dialogue can be found in Romania where the so-
                                                          
90 Direct request (CEACR) – adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014), ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Belgium). 
91 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Greece).  
92 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC Session (2016) ILO Convention 1949 No. 98 
(Malta). 
93 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC Session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Poland). 
94 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 (Spain). 
95 CFA Case No. 3039 (Denmark), 373rd Report (2014) at para. 261. 
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called ‘Social Dialogue Act’ of 2011 was ‘passed unilaterally by the government without 
being debated in parliament and without involving the social partners’.96 
 
In Hungary, anti-union measures against trade union officials or affiliates are said to be rife 
and the CEACR has again recommended ‘a forum of dialogue’ to address the issue.97 
However, the recommendation of such dialogue does not mesh well with the newly 
adopted Hungarian Labour Code, sections 8 and 9 of which ‘prohibit any conduct of workers 
including the exercise of their right to express an opinion – whether during or outside 
working time – that may jeopardize the employer’s reputation or legitimate economic and 
organizational interests’.98  
 
5. An unfettered right to ‘political’ action?  
 
Finally, in response to IOE concerns, we might wish to reflect on whether ILO principles give 
an unfettered right to take ‘political’ action in the context of the public sector. Indeed, the 
term ‘political strike’ has become associated with illegality and disapprobation.99 In the UK, 
for example, such strikes do not merit statutory protection under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (section 244(1)). The problem of course, as Lord Justice 
Roskill sagely commented in Sherard v AUEW, is that:  ‘It is all too easy for someone to speak 
of a strike as being a ‘political strike’ when what that person really means is that the object of 
the strike is something which he [sic] as an individual subjectively disapproves.’100 In so doing, 
he pointed to the potentially indeterminate content of the exception and consequent 
susceptibility to manipulation by government and employers.  
 
There may be a legitimate fear that ‘purely political strikes’ will be disruptive of democratic 
processes. However, bearing in mind their indeterminacy of content and the entitlement of 
                                                          
96 Aurora Trif, Romania: collective bargaining under attack  19(2) Transfer 227 (2013) at 233.See also 
Koukiadaki and Kretsos supra note 63.  
97 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1949 No. 98 
(Hungary).  
98 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) ILO Convention 1948 No. 87 
(Hungary). 
99 Novitz, supra note 13 at 56. 
100Sherard v AUEW [1973] ICR 421 at 435 per Roskill LJ. See for a similar view, OTTO KAHN-FREUND, PAUL DAVIES 
AND MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR AND THE LAW, 3RD EDN. (1983), 315. 
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workers to act in their economic and social interests (as identified not only by the ILO but 
human rights institutions such as the ECtHR and the ECSR) it is inappropriate to speak of 
‘political strikes’ as if they constituted an amorphous mass of iniquity. After all, strikes may 
be capable, not only of undermining, but also of facilitating democratic participation.101  
 
So, how might strikes be ‘political’? The political elements of industrial action can be identified 
in a number of ways: 
 
1. A challenge to the conventional and established managerial powers of the employer 
and in this sense any strike has a political element in that it challenges the established 
order whereby an employer instructs and a worker obeys.102 It is little wonder then 
that strikes are not popular with employers in terms of what they represent regarding 
the capacity for rebellion inherent in any workforce.  However, the clear indication by 
ILO supervisory bodies (and other human rights institutions) that workers are entitled 
to pursue their economic and social interests suggests that this challenge to the 
societal status quo is not sufficient to render strike action illegitimate. 
 
2. The adjective ‘political’ can also be used to describe actions taken that are 
ideologically motivated, for example addressing some facet of an employer’s business 
that does not relate to their immediate workers’ terms and conditions of employment. 
However, such policies may still have an effect on workers, for example in 
environmental terms or related to the delivery of public (such as medical) services. In 
this sense, the ILO view that workers can take action to protest on such matters seems 
appropriate even if it will be subject to a test of proportionality whether imposed by 
legislation or reviewed by courts (such as the ECtHR). 
 
3. The term ‘political’ can also be used merely because a strike takes place in the public 
                                                          
101 Novitz, supra note 13 at 295. 
102 In this sense, any strike is political. See for comment Melvin F. Williams, Control at All Costs: South African 
Security Legislation and the Trade Unions 30 HARV J. OF IT’L L. 477 (1989) who states at 479 that when the 
worker ‘joins the union he enters into a power relationship with the employer, and whether through strike action 
or negotiations, that worker has engaged in a political act’. 
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sector and therefore impinges on a government’s ability to deliver public services.103 
This is a naïve view of the public sector which arguably confuses the State as an 
employer with the State as a political actor, as identified by Sandra Fredman and 
Gillian Morris in their past comprehensive discussion of public sector employment.104 
Given that the State is an extraordinarily powerful employer, capable of manipulating 
the terms of public sector employment for its own larger budgetary and political 
purposes, there is arguably all the more reason to protect public sector workers rather 
than abandoning them to governmental dictates. In this sense, the ILO jurisprudence 
limiting the scope of civil servant and public service exceptions according to the core 
operations of the administration of the State and protection of the health, safety and 
well-being of the population seems more than defensible.  
 
4. A fourth possibility is that strikes may be aimed at ending government by a particular 
political party or mode of government (for example, a revolution). This will be anti-
democratic when aimed at a democratic government, but in terms of strikes taken in 
protest at non-democratic regimes, one might applaud this action especially when 
taken in coalition with other elements of civil society as was the case in Poland in the 
1980s and South Africa into the 1990s. So much is evident from ILO investigations of 
the industrial relations systems of those countries at that time.105  
 
However, leaving aside the scope of the legitimate restriction on ‘purely political strikes’, it 
seems vital to return to the basic understanding of a right to defend the social and economic 
interests of workers. This is a claim to voice (being subdued in the face of economic dictates 
in Europe and elsewhere). It is also a claim, as the Canadian Supreme Court has noted (relying 
on ILO authority), to dignity at work.106 So that workers’ terms and conditions are not merely 
                                                          
103 See supra note 12. 
104 SANDRA FREDMAN AND GILLIAN MORRIS, THE STATE AS EMPLOYER: LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICES (1986); see also Sandra Fredman and Gillian Morris, The State as Employer: is it Unique?’ 19 INDUS. 
L. J. 142 (1990). 
105 ILO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION INSTITUTED TO EXAMINE THE COMPLAINT ON THE OBSERVANCE BY 
POLAND OF CONVENTIONS NOS. 87 AND 98 (1984) Official Bulletin, Special Supplement, Vol. LXVII, Series B; 
and ILO, REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING AND CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
CONCERNING THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1992)  Prelude to Change: Industrial relations in South Africa, 
Official Bulletin, Special Supplement, Vol. LXXV, Series B.  
106 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 2015 SCC 4 at para. 54: ‘The ability to strike … allows 
workers, through collective action, to refuse to work under imposed terms and conditions. This collective 
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dictated by an employer, but rather they have the ability (which they could not have 
individually) collectively to challenge these. There are indications in Europe, in the repression 
of trade union protest, of a desire on the part of governments and employers to prioritise 
economic objectives at the expense of longstanding protections of civil, political and social 
rights.107 The ILO jurisprudence on the right to strike in the civil service, public sector and 
essential services offers a global touchstone to inform criticism of such an approach to 
industrial relations.  
 
It has been argued here that, far from being unrestricted, ILO supervisory bodies have been 
cautious in their development of norms. Their jurisprudence is detailed and far-reaching in 
terms of its influence, but there is no unfettered freedom to strike. Rather, ILO processes offer 
proportionate guidance on difficult issues, which was arrived at, not only by legal experts, but 
through important tripartite compromise between the interests of governments, workers and 
employers. The utility of these principles is reflected in the attention they receive from other 
human rights institutions and their enduring relevance has been highlighted by the European 
financial crisis, where similar issues arise in a variety of States. To abandon these standards 
now and return to national level determinations of the content and scope of the right to strike 
seems an unpalatable and irrational alternative.   
                                                          
action at the moment of impasse is an affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of employees in their working 
lives.’  
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